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This paper addresses international financial integration in a new way. We fo-
cus on informational integration, specifically, the importance of information 
conveyed by order flow in major currencies for pricing minor currencies. We 
develop a multi-currency model of portfolio allocation in the presence of dis-
persed information. We then test the model￿s implications using four months 
of concurrent transaction data on nine currencies. The model explains 45 to 
78 percent of daily returns in all nine currencies. Moreover, its prediction 
that order flow in individual markets should be relevant for determining 
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This paper addresses international financial integration in a new way. Exist-
ing work on integration can be grouped into two distinct lines, which we term 
speculative integration and geographic integration. Work on speculative integration 
is less focused on countries per se, and more focused on whether returns are 
consistent with speculative efficiency as described by international parity conditions 
(e.g., uncovered interest parity and real interest parity).1 B y  f o c u s i n g  o n  p a r i t y  
conditions, these studies relate the degree of integration to relative returns across 
money market instruments. The second line of work on integration, the geographic 
line, is more focused on national boundaries and more focused on absolute pricing of 
broad classes of securities.2 Representative of this geographic line is the recent 
survey by Karolyi and Stulz (2001), which opens with the following definition: 
￿markets where assets have the same price regardless of where they are traded are 
said to be integrated, while markets where the price of an asset depends on where it 
is traded are said to be segmented.￿ A recent example of analysis in this line is 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995), who address whether country equity indexes are priced 
according to covariance with the world market (as an integrated-market CAPM 
would predict) or according to own variance (as a closed-economy CAPM would 
predict).  
In this paper we focus instead on a dimension of integration that we term in-
formational integration.3  Specifically, our objective is to determine whether, and to 
what extent, information revealed via trades in a given currency market is im-
pounded in other currency markets. To the extent it is, we term these currency 
markets informationally integrated. Important to our working definition is the 
phrase ￿revealed in a given currency market,￿ by which we mean information that is 
                                                       
1 See, among others, Frenkel and Levich (1977), Froot and Frankel (1989), Frankel and Okongwa 
(1996), Marston (1997), and Lothian (2000). 
2 See Solnik (1974), Grauer et al. (1976), Harvey (1991), Chan et al. (1992), and Stulz (1995), among 
many others) 
3 See also related work by Hasbrouck (1995) and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) that addresses the 
question of where price discovery takes place when related securities are traded on multiple markets.  2
not otherwise publicly available. We have in mind here dispersed bits of information 
that get revealed and aggregated in the trading process, for example, information 
about time-varying risk preferences, hedging demands, or interpretations of 
macroeconomic announcements. Thus, we depart from the traditional macro 
approach to exchange rates, in which all private agents share common information, 
focusing instead on the microeconomics of information aggregation. We develop a 
model that incorporates micro variables that summarize how, precisely, dispersed 
information relevant to this market is aggregated. The model identifies interdealer 
order flow as the medium through which information about asset demands becomes 
impounded into equilibrium exchange rates.4 Specifically, our model shows that 
order flows in a given currency should be relevant not only for pricing that currency, 
but also for pricing other currencies. This arises due to the presence of dispersed 
information coupled with a portfolio problem that allocates wealth optimally across 
all currencies. Alternatively, if public demand for a particular foreign currency 
depends only on its own rate of return, the exchange rate only responds to changes 
in order flow in that one currency. In this case, order flows arising from other trades 
have no impact because they convey no relevant information. 
 We test the model￿s implications using four months of concurrent transac-
tion data on nine major currencies that float against the US dollar. Though four 
months of data is rather little on a macroeconomic time scale, it yields precise 
estimates in the context of our microeconomic analysis. (We have no reason to 
believe that these four months￿May to August, 1996￿are unrepresentative.) In all 
nine currencies, the model explains 45 to 78 percent of daily returns.5 Moreover, the 
model￿s prediction that order flow information should be relevant for determining 
prices in multiple markets is borne out. Two major currencies in particular have 
                                                       
4 Order flow￿a concept from microstructure finance￿refers to signed volume. Trades can be signed in 
microstructure models depending on whether the ￿aggressor￿ is buying or selling. (The dealer posting 
the quote is the passive side of the trade.) For example, a sale of 10 units by a trader acting on a 
dealer￿s quotes is order flow of ￿10. In rational-expectations (RE) models of trading, order flow is 
undefined because all transactions in that setting are symmetric. One might conclude from RE models 
that one could never usefully distinguish the ￿sign￿ of a trade between two willing counterparties. A 
large empirical literature in microstructure finance suggests otherwise (Lyons 2001). 
5 Our choice of the daily data frequency is motivated by our desire to ￿integrate out￿ the transitory 
price effects from order flow that show up in intraday data. Daily exchange rate changes are well 
approximated by a martingale, so accounting for daily increments translates into accounting for 
exchange rate levels over the long run (i.e. accounting for more fundamental factors). 
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substantial informational relevance in other markets: the German Mark and the 
Swiss Franc. Because 8 of our 9 currencies are European, we interpret this result as 
supportive of recent findings from work on information geography, e.g., Hau (2001). 
Finally, we find that order flow information accounts on average for about 80 
percent of the (high) unconditional covariance in currency returns. This suggests 
that the stylized fact of high covariance in currency returns is not due to the 
impounding of common public news directly into prices without any role for order 
flow (which is how the covariance is traditionally modeled). Overall, our findings 
provide qualitatively new support for the hypothesis that international money 
markets are indeed integrated. 
The remainder of the paper is in four sections. Section 2 presents the specifi-
cation of our model. Section 3 presents the model￿s equilibrium and discusses how 
integration affects exchange rate dynamics. Section 4 describes the data and 
presents empirical analysis of the link between exchange rates and order flow.   
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  The Model 
The model we use extends the Portfolio Shifts model from Evans and Lyons 
(2002) to a multi-currency setting. It is designed to show how trading in the foreign 
exchange market reveals dispersed information that underlies public currency 
demands.  In particular, our aim is to demonstrate that integration implies a link 
between a given exchange rate and order flows in markets for other currencies.  
 
2.1 Environment 
Consider an infinitely lived, pure exchange economy with K+1 assets, one of 
which is riskless and K having stochastic payoffs, which we take to represent 
foreign currencies. The return on the riskless asset is normalized to unity and is in 
zero net supply. The periodic (daily) payoff on foreign exchange, denoted by the 
(Kx1) vector R, is composed of a series of increments: 
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The vector of increments ∆Rτ  are i.i.d. N(0,ΣR) over time and are observed before 
trading in each period. These realized increments represent the flow of publicly 
available macroeconomic information over time (e.g., changes in interest rates). The 
matrix  Σ Σ Σ ΣR need not be diagonal (i.e., the contemporaneous increments may be 
correlated across currencies). 
The foreign exchange market has two participant types, customers and deal-
ers. There is a continuum of customers, indexed by z∈[0,1] and N dealers, indexed 
by i. Each of these N dealers makes a market in all K of the foreign currencies.6 The 
mass of customers on [0,1] is large (in a convergence sense) relative to the N 
dealers. (This will insure that dealers have a comparative disadvantage in holding 
overnight positions.) Customers and dealers have constant absolute risk aversion 
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where Et is the expectations operator conditional on agent￿s information at time t, 
and ct+s is consumption in period t+s. We assume that all agents have the same time 
discount factor δ, and risk aversion parameter θ. The specifics of the trading 
environment are described below (with formal setup of the dealer￿s problem 
presented in the appendix). 
  Within each day t, there are three rounds of trading: 
 
Round 1:  ∆Rt is realized, dealers quote prices and trade with the public. 
Round 2:  Dealers trade among themselves (to share inventory risk) 
Round 3:  Dealers trade again with the public (to share risk more broadly) 
 
The timing of events within each day is shown in Figure 1, which also introduces 
some notation clarified below. 
                                                       
6  Each of the individual dealer problems, then, is perhaps best thought of as representing the problem 
faced by the whole currency dealing desk at each individual bank.  5
 
2.2  Trading Round 1 
  All market participants observe ∆Rt, the period￿s increment to the vector of 
payoffs  R. On the basis of this increment and other available information, each 
dealer simultaneously and independently quotes a scalar price for each of the K 
assets to his customers at which he agrees to buy and sell any amount.7 We denote 
the (Kx1) vector of round-one prices of dealer i on day t as Pi1t. (Hereafter we shall 
suppress the t subscript for the sake of clarity whenever possible.) Each dealer then 
receives a net customer-order realization for each of the K assets, a (Kx1) vector Ci1 
that is executed at his quoted price vector, Pi1, where negative elements of Ci1 
denote a net customer sale (dealer i purchase). Each of these N customer-order 
realizations of Ci1 is distributed Normally: 
 
Ci1  ~ N(0,ΣC).                                                             (3) 
 
Customer orders are independent across dealers but not necessarily across curren-
cies (i.e., the off-diagonal elements of ΣC can be non-zero). Customer orders are also 
distributed independently of the vector of public-information increments ∆Rt. These 
orders represent liquidity demand shocks from the non-dealer public. Their realiza-
tions are not publicly observable. 
 
2.3 Trading Round 2 
   Round 2 is the interdealer trading round. Each dealer simultaneously and 
independently quotes a scalar price for each of the K assets to other dealers at 
which he agrees to buy and sell any amount. These interdealer quotes are observ-
able and available to all dealers in the market. Each dealer then simultaneously 
and independently trades on other dealers￿ quotes. Orders for a given asset at a 
                                                       
7 While it is true that a bid-ask spread of zero would not induce entry into dealing, introducing a bid-
offer spread (or price schedule) in round one to endogenize the number of dealers is a straightfor-
ward￿but distracting￿extension of our model. In equilibrium, expected utility of the commission will 
just balance the utility cost of marketmaking under risk aversion and asymmetric information. The 
model￿s simultaneous-move nature is in the spirit of simultaneous-move games more generally (versus 
sequential-move games). 
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given price are split evenly across any dealers quoting that price. Let Ti2 denote the 
(Kx1) vector of (net) interdealer trade initiated by dealer i in round 2. At the close of 
round 2, all dealers observe the net interdealer order flow, in each of the K assets 
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2.4 Trading Round 3 
  In round 3, dealers share overnight risk with the non-dealer public. Unlike 
round 1, the public￿s motive for trading in round 3 is non-stochastic and purely 
speculative. Initially, each dealer simultaneously and independently quotes a scalar 
price for each of the K assets at which he agrees to buy and sell any amount. These 
quotes are denoted by the (Kx1) vector Pi3 are observable and available to the public 
at large. 
The mass of customers on the interval [0,1] is large (in a convergence sense) 
relative to the N dealers. This implies that the dealers￿ capacity for bearing over-
night risk is small relative to the public￿s capacity. Nevertheless, the public is 
assumed to have finite risk bearing capacity, represented by negative exponential 
utility in equation (2) with aggregate risk tolerance coefficient θ . Dealers therefore 
set prices so that the public willingly absorbs dealer inventory imbalances, and each 
dealer ends the day with no net position. These round-3 prices are conditioned on 
the round-2 interdealer order flow. The interdealer order flow informs dealers of the 
size of the total inventory that the public needs to absorb to achieve stock equilib-
rium. 
 
2.5 The Public  
The public comprises a continuum of non-dealer customers, indexed by 
z∈[0,1]. Each member of the public￿s demand for the risky assets, C3, is determined 
by maximizing expected utility in equation (2) subject to the budget constraint 
 
V C P R P V c t t t t t t t ++ + =+ − + − 13 3 1 1 3 ’( ) ,                                          (5) 
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where Vt  denotes wealth at the start of day t. The conditioning information avail-
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where P t 3  denotes the common vector of round 3 prices quoted by all dealers (see 




Each of the N dealers in the market determines quotes and speculative de-
mand by maximizing the utility function shown in equation (2). Because dealers 
hold no overnight positions and face a daily stochastic environment that is time 
invariant, their optimization problem collapses to a series of independent trading 
problems in equilibrium, one for each period. Within a given period t, let Wiτ  denote 
the end-of-round τ wealth of dealer i, where we use the convention that Wi0 denotes 
wealth at the end of period t-1. (Again, we suppress the period subscript t when 
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Piτ is dealer i’s vector of round-τ quotes (one for each of the K risky assets) and a * 
denotes a vector of interdealer quotes or trades received by dealer i. The dealers￿ 
problem is defined over four choice variables: the three (Kx1) vectors of quotes Pi1, 
Pi2, and Pi3, and the dealer￿s outgoing interdealer trades in round 2 for each of the K 
assets, Ti2. These outgoing interdealer trades in round 2 have three components: 
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where  Di2 is dealer i￿s speculative demand for the K a s s e t s  i n  r o u n d  2 ,  a n d  
ET iT i [| ]
*
22 Ω  is the dealer￿s attempt to hedge against incoming orders from other 
dealers. The last three terms in the dealer￿s budget constraint capture capital 
gains/losses from round-1 customer orders Ci1, round-2 speculative demand Di2, and 
the round-2 position disturbance from incoming interdealer orders T*i2. The condi-
tioning information available to dealers, Ωi at each decision node is summarized 
below:  
 
 Round 1 quotes:  ΩPi1 ≡ {





t X τ τ  }                             (8) 
  Round  2  quotes:  ΩPi2 ≡ { ΩPi1, Ci1 } 
  Round  2  trades:  ΩTi2 ≡ { ΩPi2 } 
Round 3 quotes:  ΩPi3 ≡ { ΩPi2, Xt }. 
  
 
3.  Exchange Rates, Order Flows and the Structure of Demand 
  The equilibrium in our model describes the interaction between the N 
dealers and the public. Trade between dealers takes the form of a simultaneous-
move game: at each decision node, every dealer in the market simultaneously sets 
quotes or trades. This means that dealers cannot condition on other dealers￿ quotes 
or trading decisions when making their own. We identify equilibrium quotes and 
trades using the concept of a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, or BNE.  Under BNE, 
Bayes rule is used to update beliefs and strategies are sequentially rational given 
those beliefs. Details of the solution are presented in the Appendix. Here we discuss 
the main features of the equilibrium. 
  We first consider the properties of the optimal quoting strategies: 
 
PROPOSITION 1:  A quoting strategy is consistent with symmetric BNE only if 
the round-one and round-two quotes for each of the K assets are common across 
dealers and equal to:  
 
P1,t  =  P2,t  =  P3,t-1 +  ∆Rt,                                                (9) 
 
where P3,t-1 is the vector of round-three quote from the previous period, and ∆Rt is 
the vector of public-information payoff increments at the beginning of period t.  9
 
 
PROPOSITION 2:  A quoting strategy is consistent with symmetric BNE only if 
the common round-three quote is:  
 
P3t  =   P2t  +   ΛXt                                                                                        (10) 
 
where Λ is a (KxK) matrix of coefficients.  
 
 
The intuition behind these propositions is straightforward. Within any given 
round, all dealers quote a common price for each of the K assets in order to rule out 
arbitrage opportunities. (Recall that quoted prices are observable by all dealers in 
round 2, and all members of the public in rounds 1 and 3, and are good for any 
amount.) This means that the quoted prices can only be conditioned on common 
information. In rounds one and two, this includes the previous period￿s round-three 
price, plus the public-information innovation at the beginning of period t, ∆Rt. The 
vector of prices quoted in round 3, P3t, reflects information in both ∆Rt and order 
flows, Xt  (observed at the end of round 2).  
The information compounded in the current payoff increment ∆Rt is straight-
forward: the current increment changes the vector of payoffs R  expected by all 
dealers and members of the public, so each quoted price changes one-for-one with 
the payoff increment associated with each risky asset. The information conveyed by 
the vector of order flows is more complex. Proposition 2 shows that order flows 
arising from trade involving asset k (i.e., the k￿th row of Xt) contain information 
relevant to pricing the k￿th  asset when the k￿th diagonal element of Λ is non-zero.  
In addition, order flow relating to the k￿th asset may also contain information 
relevant for pricing the j￿th asset if element {j,k} of Λ is non zero. 
To understand the determinants of Λ, we need two further results: 
 
PROPOSITION 3:  The trading strategy profile: 
 
Ti2  =  αCi1                                                           (11) 
   
∀i ∈ {1,...,N}, where α is a (KxK) matrix, conforms to a BNE. 
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PROPOSITION 4:  If dealers quote prices in accordance with Propositions 1 and 2, 
and members of the public hold rational expectations concerning the distribution of 
equilibrium round 3 prices, the public￿s aggregate demand for foreign currency is  
 
C E P R P t t t t t 33 1 1 3 =+ − ++ ΓΦ ([ | ] ) ,                                            (12) 
 
where ΓΣ =
− () θ P
1 with  ΣP denoting the covariance of P3t+1 conditioned on informa-
tion available to the public in round 3 of period t, Φt. 
 
  Proposition 3 states that the optimal trading rule followed by dealers in 
round 2 for each of the K risky assets can be expressed as a linear function of the 
customer orders received in round 1. While trades differ across dealers (indexed by 
i) because they receive different customer orders, the relation between the size of 
customer order and the dealer￿s trade is the same across all dealers. In particular, 
the k,j element of the matrix α identified how much any dealer will trade in asset k 
conditional on receiving a one unit customer order for asset j. 
  Proposition 4 shows the structure of the public￿s equilibrium demand for 
currencies in round 3. In equilibrium, the solution to the public￿s portfolio problem 
takes the familiar form of equation (12) because the value function depends expo-
nentially on wealth, which, in turn, is conditionally normally distributed. Here the 
price sensitivity of demand depends on the degree of risk aversion, θ , and the 
conditional covariance of prices ΣP. When ΣP is diagonal, the demand for asset k is 
insensitive to the expected price change for asset j (≠k).  
  With the aid of equations (9) ￿ (12) we can now describe how the link 
between order flows and prices is related to the structure of the publics￿ demand for 
currencies. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: In a BNE, where members of the public hold rational expecta-
tions, the change in the vector of prices quoted in round 3 from day t-1 to day t is: 
 
t t t X R P Λ + ∆ = ∆ ,                                                           (13) 
 
where the matrix Λ is diagonal if and only if  ΣC and Σ R  are diagonal. 
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  Proposition 5 shows how the link between order flows and price changes 
relates to the structure of the public￿s currency demand. In particular, the proposi-
tion identifies the conditions under the price change for each foreign currency is 
affected by own order flows only; namely when ΣC and Σ R  are both diagonal.8 When 
Σc or Σ R  is not diagonal, order flows arising from trades between the home and a 
given foreign currency can convey information that affects the daily price change in 
each foreign currency. In the case of a non-diagonal ΣC, the notion of conveying 
information takes on special significance. Even in common knowledge environ-
ments, one expects that supply and demand in one market can affect prices in 
another. In the case of a non-diagonal ΣC, however, the demands in other markets 
are conveying information that is not common knowledge, and this represents a 
distinct channel through which order flow has price impact. 
  To understand the intuition behind this result, consider the case where ΣC 
and  Σ R  are diagonal. Here the customer orders received by each dealer in round 1 
are uncorrelated across currencies and the public￿s demand for currency k in round 
3 depends only on the expected price change for currency k (see equation 12). In 
equilibrium, the vector of outgoing interdealer trades in round 2, Ti2, comprise 
customer orders from round 1, ci1, and the dealers speculative demand, Di2 (because  
ET iT i [| ]
*
22 0 Ω= , see equation 7). When Σc and Σ R  are diagonal, there is no loss of 
expected utility from a dealer choosing his speculative demand for each currency 
separately. Consequently, as in Evans and Lyons (2002), the dealers trade during 
round 2 is proportional to the customer order he received in round 1 on a currency 
by currency basis (i.e., Ti2 = αCi1  where α is diagonal). This implies that dealers can 
infer the size of the aggregate portfolio shift for currency k on the part of the public 
in round 1 from the order flow from trades between the home and k￿th currency 
alone (i.e., the k￿th. element of X).  Dealers also know that the public needs to be 
induced to re-absorb this portfolio shift in round 3 and that the public￿s demand for 
                                                       
8 There has to be a strong a priori presumption that Σ R  is not diagonal: for example, when informa-
tion is relevant to the U.S. then one would expect it to affect the payoffs on all bilateral exchange rates 
that involve the dollar. Our specification of K risky assets, each with its own random payoff, does not 
embed this possibility of nation-specific information explicitly (though a non-diagonal Σ R  can 
accommodate it). Note too that triangular arbitrage will also introduce non-diagonal structure to Σ R .  12
currency k depends only on the expected price change for currency k (see equation 
12).  This inducement requires an adjustment in the price of the k currency alone. 
Hence, only order flows associated with trade between the home and k￿th. foreign 
currency affect the price of the k￿th. currency.  
 When  both  Σc and Σ R  are not diagonal, the relation between prices and 
order flows change for two reasons. First, when Σ R  is not diagonal, the price of each 
currency needs to be adjusted in response to every element of the aggregate round-1 
customer order. This is necessary to induce the public to absorb the realized 
portfolio shift, which can be seen from inverting the publics￿ round 3-demand curve: 
 
P E P R C tt t t p t 33 1 1 3 =+ − ++ [| ] ΦΣ θ . 
 
In equilibrium, E P P R t t t t [| ] 31 31 + Φ∆ =+ − , so the aggregate portfolio shift, C t 3 , must be 
completely accommodated by changing the vector of round 3 prices, P t 3 . To clear the 
market, the price of the k￿th. currency must therefore be set with regard to the 
portfolio shifts in every currency according to the elements in the k￿th row of Σ p.  
The second difference arises because it is no longer optimal for dealer specu-
lative demands in round 2 to be proportional to round 1-customer orders on a 
currency-by-currency basis. This means that a dealer￿s trade in currency k is no 
longer proportional to his customer order for currency k. As a result, it is not 
possible to infer the size of the aggregate portfolio shift for currency k on the part of 
the public in round 1 from the order flow from trades between the home and k￿th 
currency alone. In general, all the order flows are needed to make inferences about 
the size of the aggregate portfolio shift in each of the k currencies. Under these 
circumstances, all order flows will affect each price even if Σ R  is diagonal because 
they contain information about the size of the portfolio shift that the public must 
absorb, which affects the setting of each round 3 price. 
  To summarize, our model shows how interdealer order flows act as medium 
through which information about the publics￿ asset demands becomes impounded 
into equilibrium exchange rates. In particular, the model shows that the informa-
tion contained in individual order flows varies according to structure of the public￿s  13
portfolio demand and dealers￿ speculative demands. In special cases, order flows 
arising from trades between the home and a particular foreign currency act as a 
sufficient statistic for the aggregate portfolio shift that must be absorbed by the 
public, and this shift can be induced by the change in just one exchange rate. In the 
more general case, many order flows contain information relevant for determining 
the aggregate portfolio shifts in any one currency, and many prices must be ad-
justed to induce the public to absorb the shift. In these circumstances, multiple 
order flows appear as proximate determinants of daily exchange rate changes. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Data 
  The dataset contains daily measures of actual transactions for nine spot 
markets over a four-month period, May 1 to August 31, 1996: Mark, Yen, Pound, 
Belgium Franc, French Franc, Swiss Franc, Krona, Lira and Guilder; all verses the 
Dollar. As noted in the introduction, we chose the daily frequency in order to 
￿integrate out￿ the transitory price effects from order flow that show up in intraday 
data. (Daily exchange rate changes are well approximated by a martingale.) The 
data were collected from the Reuters Dealing 2000-1 system via an electronic feed 
customized for the purpose. Dealing 2000-1 is the most widely used electronic 
dealing system. According to Reuters, over 90 percent of the world’s direct inter-
dealer transactions take place through the system.9 All trades on this system take 
the form of bilateral electronic conversations. The conversation is initiated when a 
dealer uses the system to call another dealer to request a quote. Users are expected 
to provide a fast two-way quote with a tight spread, which is in turn dealt or 
declined quickly (i.e., within seconds). To settle disputes, Reuters keeps a temporary 
record of all bilateral conversations. This record is the source of our data. (Reuters 
was unable to provide the identity of the trading partners for confidentiality 
reasons.) 
                                                       
9 In 1996, interdealer transactions accounted for about two-thirds of total trading in major spot 
markets. This two-thirds from interdealer trading breaks into two transaction types￿direct and 
brokered. Direct trading accounted for about half of interdealer trade and brokered trading accounted 
for the other half. For more detail on the Reuters Dealing 2000-1 System, see Lyons (1995) and Evans 
(2001).  14
For these trades executed on D2000-1 our data set includes a bought/sold in-
dicator that allows us to measure signed volume, i.e., order flow, directly. This is a 
major advantage: we do not have to use the noisy algorithms used elsewhere in the 
literature for signing trades. One drawback is that it is not possible to identify the 
size of individual transactions. For model estimation, order flow is therefore 
measured as the difference between the number of buyer-initiated and seller-
initiated trades.10  
  The variables in our empirical model are measured daily. We take the spot 
rate, as the last purchase-transaction price (foreign currency/$) before 4:00 pm 
London time.11 To facilitate comparisons of our results across currencies, we focus 
on the daily change in the log transaction price rather than the change in the actual 
price. Order flow for currency k, is the difference between the number of buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades between currency k and the dollar (in thousands, negative 
sign denotes net dollar sales) during the 24 hours before 4:00 pm.  Market activity 
after 4 PM on Friday is aggregated until 4 PM on Monday.  
 
4.2 Characteristics 
  Sample statistics for daily exchange rate changes and order flows are 
reported in Table 1. As expected, the mean change in (log) prices is very close to zero 
and appears serially uncorrelated for all currencies. Thus, there is no evidence that 
daily exchange rate changes can be predicted from the history of past changes. The 
mean of daily order flow is also close to zero and serially uncorrelated for 7 of the 9 
currencies. The exceptions are the order flows associated with the Pound and 
French Franc where the order flows display significant positive autocorrelations at 
lags 1 and 2.  
Table 2 reports statistics on the contemporaneous correlations in daily ex-
change rate changes (i.e., daily changes in log prices) and order flows. The upper 
panel of the table shows the sample correlation between each of the exchange rates 
listed in the rows and columns.  In all cases, the correlations are positive. The table 
                                                       
10 This is common in the literature; see, for example, Hasbrouck (1991). See also Jones et al. (1994) for 
analysis suggesting that trade size conveys no additional information (beyond that conveyed by the 
number of buys minus sells). 
11 The last purchase transaction is generally within a few seconds of the end of the hour. Using 
purchase transactions eliminates bid-ask bounce.  15
also reports the asymptotic p-value for the null hypothesis of a zero correlation in 
parenthesis below each sample correlation. With the exception of the pound-yen 
correlation, all the p-values are extremely small indicating that the positive sample 
correlations are indeed highly statistically significant. The lower panel of Table 2 
reports analogous statistics for order flows. Overall, order flows are less strongly 
correlated across currency pairs than exchange rates. In some cases, the correla-
tions are negative, but not statistically significantly. Correlations between the order 
flows associated with European currencies are generally positive, and statistically 
significant.  
 
4.3 Model Estimates 
The focus of our empirical analysis is equation (13) from Proposition 5, which 
links exchange rates to order flows and public information increments, ∆Rt. For our 
empirical model, we assume the latter take the form of serially uncorrelated shocks 
that affect the exchange rate directly (i.e., these shocks have no effect on order flow, 
as is commonly assumed; see, e.g., Hasbrouck 1991). Our empirical version of (13) 
for exchange rate k is  
 










, ,                                          (14) 
 
where ∆pt
k is the daily change in the log k currency price of dollars, and Xt
j is the 
daily order flow associated with currency j. The coefficients, λ kj, correspond to the 
elements from row k of the matrix Λ (from equation 13) identifying the price-impact 
of order flow j on exchange rate k. The effects of the public information increment 
are captured by the residual vt
k. Theoretically speaking, these increments must be 
serially uncorrelated, and uncorrelated with all the order flows. They may, however, 
be correlated across exchange rates. For example, public news directly impacting 
the international value of the Dollar, will affect all the exchange rates in our 
sample. To account for this possibility, we estimate (14) as part of a GLS system. 
Table 3 reports estimates for two versions of (14): one including the own or-
der flow only, Xt
k; the other including all the sample order flows. In six of the nine  16
exchange rates, the coefficient on own order flow, λ kk, is positive and highly 
statistically significant when Xt
k is the only order flow included in the regression. 
Interestingly, the estimates of λ kk are much larger in the cases of the less heavily 
traded currencies, such as the Lira, French Franc, Swiss Franc and Pound, than for 
the Mark and the Yen. (Recall that the dependent variable for each equation is the 
difference in the log foreign currency price of Dollars.)  This observation is consis-
tent with idea that the price impact of order flow should be large in less liquid 
markets. (see, for example, Kyle 1985). It is also worth noting that in the cases 
where the price impact of own order flow is statistically significant, order flow 
accounts for a substantial fraction of the variance in daily exchange rates. The R2 
statistics range from 0.33 (in the case of the Pound) to 0.68 (in the case of Mark).  
Estimates of (14) including all the order flows are reported in the lower por-
tion of each cell in Table 3. Two striking results emerge from these estimates. First, 
for every exchange rate the array of order flows account for a substantial fraction of 
returns: the majority of the R2 statistics are over 65 percent, ranging between 45 
and 78 percent. When judged in light of past empirical disappointments (Meese and 
Rogoff 1983, Frankel and Rose 1995), this is a remarkable finding. It provides 
strong confirmation that order flows are an important (proximate) determinant of 
daily exchange rate changes. Second, at least two order flows have a statistically 
significant impact on the exchange rate in every case. For every currency save the 
Yen, order flows associated with the Mark have a positive and statistically signifi-
cant price impact even after accounting for the price impact of own order flow. For 
some exchange rates, these cross-currency effects are economically quite significant. 
For example, in the case of the Krona, the price impact of Mark and S Franc are 
highly significant and the R2 rises from less than 1 percent to 68 percent when all 
order flows are introduced. Note too that for all three of the currencies that show a 
weak own-flow effect (the B Franc, Krona, and Guilder), all three are strongly 
affected by flows in the two dominant regional currencies, the Mark and S Franc. 
This is consistent with recent findings of ￿information geographies￿ in financial 
markets (see, e.g., Hau 2001). 
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4.4 Covariance Decompositions 
  What fraction of the high contemporaneous correlation in currency returns 
(upper panel of Table 1) can be accounted for by order-flow-induced price move-
ments?12 Table 4 presents an answer to this question.  The upper entry in each cell 
reports the fraction of the covariance between ∆pt
j and ∆pt
i (for column currency j 
and row currency i) that is attributable to order flows. This is calculated as the 
statistic  () ￿￿ 1( , ) / ( , ) −∆ ∆
ji j i
tt t t Cov v v Cov p p , where $ vt
k for k = i, j, is the estimated 
residual from regression equation (14), i.e., the portion of price variation unac-
counted for by order flow. The lower entry reports in parenthesis the asymptotic p-
value for the null hypothesis that the fraction equals unity (i.e., Cov v v t
j
t
i ($ , $ ) = 0). Note 
that order flow information accounts on average for about 80 percent of the (high) 
unconditional covariance in currency returns. This suggests that the stylized fact of 
high covariance in currency returns is not due to the impounding of common public 
news directly into prices without any role for order flow (which is how the covari-
ance is traditionally modeled). 
 
4.5 Implications 
  The results in Table 3 indicate rather strongly that order flows across the 
market are a proximate cause of daily exchange rate movements in all our sample 
currencies. According to our model, this arises because market wide order flows 
contain information about the aggregate shifts in the publics￿ demand for currency 
that is valuable to dealers seeking to set market clearing prices (i.e., to establish 
stock equilibrium). Further, the model identified the conditions under which 
market-wide order flows would not contain any more price relevant information 
than the order flow arising from trade in one currency pair. The results in Table 3 
indicate that these conditions do not hold.  On the contrary, when viewed from the 
perspective Proposition 5, our empirical results suggest strongly that Σc and Σ R  
cannot both be diagonal; dealers and the public appear to be solving integrated 
portfolio problems to determine their currency demands.    
                                                       
12 This question is motivated in part by the well-known fact that high return correlation is not 
necessarily evidence of high market integration. Indeed, even markets in autarky can exhibit high 
return correlation if the shocks they are exposed to are highly correlated.  18
Further support for this view comes from Tables 1 and 2. The results in Ta-
ble 1 indicate that is hard to predict exchange rates from their history alone.  This 
means that the covariance matrix of the exchange rate changes conditioned on 
public information (i.e., excluding order flows) is well approximated by the uncondi-
tional covariance matrix. The results in Table 2 imply that this matrix has many 
off-diagonal elements that are significant. Thus, the behavior of exchange rates in 
our sample suggests strongly that the public￿s demand for foreign currencies should 
be derived as the solution to a multi-currency portfolio problem rather than a 
collection of single-currency problems (as is often presumed in past empirical work 
using transactions data). Our finding that market-wide order flows account for a 
significant fraction of daily exchange rate changes is indeed consistent with this 
view. If there had been no statistically significant evidence of cross-currency order 
flow effects in Table 3, we would have been unable to reject the hypothesis that 
demands for currencies by the public are segmented. In view of the strong contem-
poraneous correlations amongst exchange rates, such a finding would have cast 
doubt on the degree to which international money markets are informationally 
integrated. Our findings in Table 3 point in the opposite direction. The strong links 
between order flows and exchange rates a symptomatic of a high degree of informa-
tional integration in international money markets.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
  This paper develops a multi-currency model of portfolio allocation in the 
presence of dispersed information and tests the model￿s main implication, namely 
that order flow in one market should directly affect prices in others. The model 
explains 45 to 78 percent of daily returns in all nine of the currencies we examine. 
Moreover, the model￿s prediction that order flow information should be relevant for 
determining prices in multiple markets is borne out. Order flows in two currencies 
in particular have substantial informational impact on prices in other markets: the 
German Mark and the Swiss Franc.13 This is in keeping with recent empirical 
                                                       
13 Under our null hypothesis, these cross-market order flow effects operate directly, i.e., other markets 
learn from the German Mark and Swiss Franc order flow itself rather than learning from the DM/$ 
and SF/$ exchange rates (which are themselves determined from their own-market order flows). The 
important point for this paper is that the underlying drivers are the order flows. Exactly how the  19
results on information geography (8 of our 9 currencies are within European 
geographic region). Finally, we find that order flow information accounts on average 
for about 80 percent of the (high) unconditional covariance in currency returns. 
  Though our introduction distinguishes between speculative, geographic, and 
informational integration, these three lines of work are by no means independent. 
Nevertheless, the macro approach to asset pricing has never afforded informational 
integration much attention because it presumes that all relevant information is 
public. In those traditional settings, there is no role for aggregation of dispersed 
information￿public information is directly and immediately impounded in asset 
prices, across the board. In more realistic information environments, however, the 
notion of informational integration has some traction. Our results suggest that FX 
markets are such an environment, despite the common belief that private or 
dispersed information is less relevant in FX than in other security markets. More 
broadly, it is not unreasonable to view all three of the integration approaches as 
being, fundamentally, about informational integration. Whether this type of 
synthesis is meaningful for future work remains to be seen. 
  One policy area where the above synthesis may be useful is that of central 
bank intervention. In particular, consider the important issue of whether coordina-
tion across central banks makes intervention more effective. If intervention is 
uncoordinated, it will not take account of the cross-currency information effects that 
we document here. Interestingly, even if coordinated (in the usual sense of being 
simultaneous and in the same direction), intervention efforts might still not take 
full account of the cross-currency information effects documented here. Our results 
suggest that order flows can act on the full constellation of exchange rates, not 
simply on in the markets where intervention is executed. In some markets, these 
indirect effects appear to be significant. 
                                                                                                                                                              
information conveyed by order flows propagates is a question about the transmission mechanism, not 
the underlying drivers.     20
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Table 1: Sample Statistics 
 
Currency  Variable  Mean (%)  Sdt. (%)  ρ1  ρ2 
  
Mark  
  ∆pt  -0.035 0.396  0.052  -0.019 
  Xt  0.001 0.137  -0.033  0.099 
Yen         
  ∆pt  0.033  0.419 0.021 0.032 
  Xt  0.036  0.099 0.161 0.140 
Pound         
  ∆pt  -0.043  0.305 0.066 0.109 
  Xt  0.012 0.049  0.289*  0.102* 
B. Franc         
  ∆pt  -0.039 0.381  0.089  -0.046 
  Xt  0.003  0.007 -0.115 -0.095 
S Franc         
  ∆pt  -0.035 0.528  0.038  -0.023 
  Xt  -0.015  0.070 0.154 0.073 
Krona         
  ∆pt  -0.044 0.413  -0.030  0.037 
  Xt  0.000 0.004  -0.005  0.079 
F. Franc         
  ∆pt  -0.017 0.351  0.117  -0.094 
  Xt  0.000 0.028  0.301*  0.247*   
Lira         
  ∆pt  -0.035 0.264  -0.149  0.054 
  Xt  0.001  0.015 0.132 0.085 
Guilder         
  ∆pt  -0.039 0.412  0.008  -0.024 
  Xt  -0.002  0.006 0.013 0.018 
 
Notes: Sample statistics for: ∆pt, the daily change in the log transaction price (foreign currency/$); 
and  Xt, daily order flow measured is the difference between the number of buyer- and seller-
initiated trades between currency k and the dollar (in thousands, negative sign denotes net dollar 
sales). ρ1 and ρ2 denote sample autocorrelations at lags one and two. A ￿*￿ denotes significance at 
the 5 per cent level. Market activity after 4 PM on Friday is aggregated until 4 PM on Monday. 




Table 2:  Contemporaneous Correlations 
 
Returns              
  Mark  Yen  Pound  B. Fr.  S. Fr.  Krona  F. Fr.  Lira 
Yen 0.47       
              
Pound 0.49  0.07          
              
B. Franc  0.95  0.47  0.47           
              
S.  Franc  0.92  0.55 0.40 0.89         
              
Krona  0.85  0.42 0.41 0.88  0.80       
              
F.  Franc  0.94  0.48 0.48 0.94  0.91  0.85     
              
Lira  0.61  0.37 0.35 0.63  0.61  0.52 0.67   
              
Guilder  0.94  0.49 0.48 0.96  0.88  0.86 0.92  0.66 
              
Order flow              
  Mark  Yen  Pound  B. Franc  S. Franc Krona  F. Franc  Lira 
Yen  0.18            
  (0.09)            
Pound 0.28  0.15          
 (0.0)  (0.16)             
B. Franc  0.18  0.23  -0.09           
 (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.40)           
S  Franc  0.64  0.25 0.34 0.10         
  (0.00)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.33)         
Krona  -0.02 -0.03 0.15 0.09  0.09       
  (0.85)  (0.79) (0.18) (0.41)  (0.43)       
F.  Franc  0.56  0.30 0.23 0.13  0.47  0.08     
  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.03) (0.22)  (0.00)  (0.46)     
Lira  0.29  0.28 0.31 0.08  0.41  0.18 0.37   
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.48)  (0.00)  (0.10) (0.00)   


















Notes: Contemporaneous correlations in daily data. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All return 
correlations (log price change) are significant at the 1 percent level, save the Pound-Yen correlation 
(p-value 0.52). Asymptotic p-values for the null hypothesis of a zero correlation are reported in 
parentheses for order flow correlations (see Hamilton 1994, p. 301). Sample: daily data from May 1 






Table 3: Price Change Regressions 
 
Order Flows  Diagnostics   
 
Return  Mark  Yen  Pound B. Franc S. Franc Krona  F. Franc  Lira  Guilder 
2 R
2
serial χ  
2
hetero χ  
Mark  2.28            0.68  0.37  0.01 
  (8.74)                0.33  0.05 
    1.63  0.16  0.22    -1.55  1.33  1.39  1.24  1.73  4.11  0.76  0.55  0.21 
   (7.49)   (0.69)   (0.47)    (0.55)   (3.35)   (0.28)   (1.32)   (1.02)   (1.20)    0.38  0.13 
Yen    2.61             0.45  0.07  0.03 
    (7.69)               0.38  0.15 
  -0.11 2.16 0.88 5.49  1.34 -4.10 1.76  0.24  -0.24  0.54  0.02  0.01 
  (0.33) (6.52) (1.30) (1.33)  (2.32)  (0.55) (1.28)  (0.10)  -(0.05)    0.09  0.06 
Pound    3.41            0.33  0.01  0.20 
     (5.16)              0.00  0.70 
  0.65  0.04  2.69 -4.54  0.01  -2.18 -0.27  3.17 -0.22  0.45  0.00 0.44 
  (2.67) (0.15) (5.26) (1.44)  (0.02)  (0.39) (0.26)  (1.68) (0.06)    0.00  0.58 
B. Franc      3.11          0.00  0.39  0.82 
      (0.73)            0.71  0.95 
  1.38 0.18 0.00  -3.26  1.42  2.79 1.87  2.31 4.32  0.78  0.32  0.78 
  (6.80) (0.83) (0.01) (1.24)  (3.86)  (0.59) (2.13)  (1.46) (1.36)    0.19  0.00 
S. Franc      5.11        0.53  0.45  0.80 
       (6.13)          0.16  0.92 
  1.45 0.75 0.53  -4.96  2.89 -8.26 0.90  2.94 4.65  0.70  0.22  0.14 
  (4.40) (2.21) (0.77) (1.17)  (4.86)  (1.08) (0.63)  (1.15) (0.90)    0.14  0.02 
Krona         6.33       0.00  0.75  0.50 
         (0.55)         0.56  0.57 
  0.91 0.23  -0.68  -2.27  2.19  0.23 1.74  1.36 7.72  0.69  0.23  0.91 
  (3.52) (0.87) (1.25) (0.68)  (4.66)  (0.04) (1.55)  (0.68) (1.90)    0.01  0.99 
F. Franc           7.46     0.40  0.74  0.60 
           (4.53)       0.29  0.21 
  1.13 0.11  -0.06  -1.94  1.02 -6.37 2.17  4.21 5.33  0.75  0.85  0.27 
  (5.66) (0.52) (0.14) (0.75)  (2.83)  (1.37) (2.52)  (2.71) (1.70)    0.02  0.00 
Lira                 10.69    0.37  0.15  0.76 
                   (6.06)      0.46  0.80 
  0.68 -0.12  1.07  -2.40  0.11 -15.66 0.21  10.90 4.45  0.65  0.09 0.65 




Table 3: Price Change Regressions (Cont.) 
 
Guilder              15.77  0.06  0.81  0.53 
              (1.57)    0.44  0.73 
  1.36 0.18 0.23  -1.85  1.61  1.02 1.83  3.68 6.18  0.75  0.56  0.36 
  (5.77) (0.74) (0.47) (0.61)  (3.76)  (0.19) (1.80)  (2.01) (1.68)    0.36  0.37 
 
Notes: The table reports GLS coefficient estimates (x100) with absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
The sample spans four months (May 1 to August 31, 1996), which is 89 trading days.
2
serial χ  is the 
p-value of a chi-squared test for residual first-order (top row) and fifth-order (bottom row) serial 
correlation.
2
hetero χ  is the p-value of a chi-squared test for first-order (top row) and fifth-order 






Table 4: Covariance Decomposition 
 
           
  Mark  Yen  Pound  B. Franc S. Franc  Krona  F. Franc  Lira 
Yen  0.69         
  (0.00)         
Pound  0.79  1.06        
  (0.01)  (0.94)        
B.  Franc  0.81  0.71  0.86       
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.08)       
S  Franc  0.76  0.68  0.82  0.80      
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.00)      
Krona 0.82  0.78  0.93  0.82  0.84       
 (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.49)  (0.00)  (0.00)       
F.  Franc  0.78 0.69 0.83 0.81 0.76 0.82     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Lira 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.84 0.83 0.90 0.86   
  (0.01) (0.08) (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01)   



















Notes: The upper entry in each cell reports the fraction of the covariance between ∆pt
j and 
∆pt
i for column currency j  and row currency i, attributable to the order flows: 







i ($ , $ )/ ( , ) ∆∆, where $ vt
k for k = i, j, is the estimated residual from regres-
sion (14). The lower entry reports in parenthesis the asymptotic p-value for the null 
hypothesis that the fraction equals unity (i.e., Cov v v t
j
t




Portions of these proofs are matrix equivalents of proofs contained in Evans and Lyons (1999) and Cao,
Evans, and Lyons (2002); we refer readers to those earlier papers for additional detail.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s1a n d2
No arbitrage requires that all dealers post a common vector of quotes in any given trading round. Common
prices require that quotes be conditioned on commonly observed information only. In rounds one and two,
this includes the previous day￿s vector of round-three prices, plus the public-information innovation at the
beginning of day t, ∆Rt.( D e a l e ri￿s round-two quote therefore cannot be conditioned on his realization of
Ci1.)
The equations that pin down the levels of these prices embed the dealer and customer trading rules.
These trading rules must be consistent with equilibrium price. This implies the following key relations:
E [Ci1|ΩP1]+E [Di2(P1)|ΩP1]=0 , (A1)
E [Ci1|ΩP1]+E [Di2(P2)|ΩP1]=0 , (A2)
E [C1|ΩP3]+E [C3(P3)|ΩP3]=0 , (A3)
where C1 =
PN
i=1 Ci1.The ￿rst two equations state that P1and P2 must be set such that customer demand
and dealer demand are expected to oﬀset (and that these prices are conditioned on public information). The
third equation states that P3 must be set such that customer demand in round￿s one and three are expected
to oﬀset (i.e., at the round three price the public willingly absorbs the random round one aggregate portfolio
shift). These equations pin down equilibrium price because any price except that which satis￿es each would
generate net excess demand in round-2 interdealer trading, which cannot be reconciled since dealers trade
among themselves.
Proposition 1 follows directly from the fact that expected value of Ci1 conditional on public information
ΩP1 is a vector of zeros, and expected speculative dealer demand Di2 is also a vector of zeros at this public-
information-unbiased price. To be more precise, this statement postulates that the dealer￿s demand Di2 has
this property; we show below in the derivation of the optimal trading rule that this is the case.
Proposition 2 follows from the fact that Xt is a suﬃcient statistic for the period￿s aggregate portfolio
shift
PN
i=1 Ci1. Given the aggregate portfolio shift must be absorbed by the public in round 3, P3t must
adjust to induce the necessary public demand. Speci￿cally, the round-3 price must satisfy:
C3(P3t)+C1 =0 .
Given the optimal rule for determining Ti2 (Ti2 = αCi1 which we establish below), we can write C1 in terms
of interdealer order ￿ow Xt as:
C1 = α−1Xt
A1and since the speci￿cation for the public￿s demand is:
C3 = Γ(E [P3t+1 + Rt+1|Φt] − P3t),
this implies a market-clearing round-3 price of:
P3t = E [P3t+1 + Rt+1|Φt]+( αΓ)
−1 Xt.





with Λ =( αΓ)
−1. This sum is the expected payoﬀ on the risky asset (the ∆Rτ terms), adjusted for a risk
premium, which is determined by cumulative portfolio shifts (the Xτ terms). This yields equation (13) in
the text, and together with Proposition 1 gives equation (9).
Equilibrium Trading Strategies
An implication of common interdealer quotes P2 is that in round 2 each dealer receives a share 1/(N −1)
of every other dealer￿s interdealer trade. This order corresponds to the position disturbance T∗
i2 in the
dealer￿s problem.
Given the quoting strategy described in Propositions 1 and 2, the trading strategy described in Proposition
3 is optimal and corresponds to symmetric linear equilibrium:
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
As noted above, because returns are independent across periods, with an unchanging stochastic structure,
the dealers￿ problem collapses to a series of independent trading problems, one for each period (see Cao,
Evans and Lyons (2002) for further details).. Because there are only N dealers, however, each dealer acts
strategically in the sense that his speculative demand depends on the impact his trade will have on subsequent
prices.
It is well known that if a random variable W is distributed N(µ,σ2) and the utility function U(W)=





. Maximizing E[U(W)] is therefore equivalent to max-
imizing (µ − θ
2σ2). This result allows us to write the dealers speculative-demand problem as:
Max{Di2}D0
i2(E[P3|ΩTi2] − P2) − θ
2D0
i2ΞDi2, (A4)
where the information set ΩTi2 is de￿ned in the text, and Ξ denotes the variance of P3 conditioned on ΩTi2.
A2Now, from Proposition 2, we can write:
E[P3|ΩTi2] − P2 = E[ΛXt|ΩTi2]. (A5)
And from the de￿nitions of ΩTi2 and Xt we know that:
E[ΛXt|ΩTi2]=ΛTi2. (A6)
The expected value of the other dealers￿ trades in Xt is 0 under our speci￿cation because: (i) customer
trades are mean-zero and independent across dealers, and (ii) there is no information in the model other
than customer trades to motivate speculative demand. This fact also implies that dealer i￿s trade in round
2, Ti2 from equation (7), is equal to:
Ti2 = Di2 + Ci1.
Therefore, we can write the dealer￿s problem as:
Max{Di2}D0
i2Λ(Di2 + Ci1) − θ
2D0
i2ΞDi2. (A7)
The ￿rst-order condition of this problem is:
(Λ + Λ0)Di2 + ΛCi2 − θΞDi2 =0 , (A8)
which implies a speculative demand of:
Di2 =( θΞ − (Λ + Λ0))−1ΛCi1. (A9)
This demand function, and the fact that Ti2 = Di2 + Ci1, imply:
Di2 =
h
(θΞ − (Λ + Λ0))
−1 Λ + I
i
Ci1 = αCi1. (A10)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
With the riskless asset in zero net supply, the optimization problem facing the public can be written as
Max{C3}E [−exp(−θVt+1)|Φt]
s.t.Vt+1 = C0
3t(P3t+1 + Rt+1 − P3t).
Under our assumptions, and following from the results in Propositions 1 and 2, the conditional distri-
bution of the public￿s wealth, Vt+1, is normal with mean C0
3 (E [P3t+1 + Rt+1|Φt] − P3t), and variance
A3C
0
3Va r(P3t+1 + Rt+1|Φt)C3. The ￿rst order condition for the maximization problem is therefore
E [P3t+1 + Rt+1|Φt] − P3t − θΣPC3t =0 .
Rearranging this equation and aggregating over the continuum of agents that comprise the public gives
equation (12). Although the assumed zero net supply of the riskless asset simpli￿es the optimization problem,
this assumption is not necessary to derive equation (12). In particular, Cao, Evans, and Lyons (2002) show
that the value function associated with the public￿s optimization problem is exponential in wealth even when
the public￿s equilibrium holdings of the riskless asset are non-zero. And, as a result, the ￿rst order condition
for C3 takes the same form as the equation above.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Part A: Show that diagonality of Λ implies diagonality of ΣP and ΣR. If Λ diagonal then Λ =Λ0.F r o m
the de￿nitions above we have
Λ = θΣP (θΞ − Λ0)
−1 (θΞ − Λ − Λ0) (A11)
so if Λ is diagonal,
Λ = θΣP (θΞ − Λ)
−1 (θΞ − 2Λ)=θ(θΞ − 2Λ)(θΞ − Λ)
−1 ΣP = Λ0
since Ξ and ΣP are by de￿nition symmetric. Now vectorize the inner two terms:
vec
‡
θΣP (θΞ − Λ)




θ(θΞ − 2Λ)(θΞ − Λ)
−1 ΣP
·
which can be rewritten as









Clearly, this condition can only hold when
I =( ( θΞ − 2Λ) ⊗ ΣP)
−1 (ΣP ⊗ (θΞ − 2Λ))
=
¡












P (θΞ − 2Λ)
¢
= Ψ−1 ⊗ Ψ
It is straightforward to check that the last equality only holds when Ψ = Σ−1
P (θΞ − 2Λ)=sI for some
non-zero scalar s. Rearranging this condition, gives Λ = 1
2(θΞ−sΣP). Combining this expression with (A11)
A4gives
Λ = sθΣP (θΞ − Λ)
−1 ΣP
















Rearranging this equation, gives
sΘ + ΘΘ = sθI (A12)
where Θ = Σ−1
P Λ. Transposing both sides of this equation gives
sΘ0 + Θ0Θ0 = sθI
which is exactly the same form as (A12) with Θ0 replacing Θ. Any solution to the equation must therefore
be symmetric. This means that Σ−1
P Λ = Λ(Σ−1
P )0, a condition that is only satis￿ed when Λ is diagonal if ΣP
is diagonal. Finally, recall that Λ = 1
2(θΞ − sΣP), so Ξ = 1
θ (2Λ + sΣP) must be diagonal. By de￿nition,
Ξ = Va r(P3,t|ΩTi2)=ΛVa r(Xt|cit)Λ0 where Va r(Xt|cit)=N−1
N αΣcα0. Hence Ξ = N−1
N ΛαΣcα0Λ0 =
N−1




p so ΣC must also be diagonal.
To complete part A of the proof, we need to show that the diagonality of ΣP and ΣC implies that ΣR is
also diagonal. Equations (9) and (10) imply that
P3t+1 = P3t + ∆Rt+1 + ΛXt+1.
So, if members of the public hold rational expectations,
ΣP ≡ Va r(P3t+1|Φt)=ΣR + ΛVa r(Xt+1|Φt)Λ0 (A13)
From Proposition 3, Xt+1 = α
PN
i=1 Ci1t+1 where the Ci1t+1 vectors are distributed independently across
the N dealers, with covariance ΣC. Hence, Va r(Xt+1|Φt)=NαΣcα0. Substituting this expression in (A13)
and simplifying gives
ΣP = ΣR + Nθ
2ΣPΣCΣP. (A14)
This equation implicitly de￿nes the relation between ΣR,ΣC and ΣP when members of the public hold
rational expectations. It follows trivially from this equation that ΣR must be diagonal if ΣP and ΣC are
diagonal.
Part B: Now we show that diagonality of ΣC and ΣR implies diagonality of Λ. First we demonstrate that
Λ is diagonal if ΣC and ΣP are diagonal. We then show that diagonality of ΣC and ΣR implies diagonality
A5of ΣP.
If Σc and ΣP are diagonal, Ξ and Λα diagonal. Hence
Λα = Λ(θΞ − Λ − Λ0)−1 (θΞ − Λ0)=( θΞ − Λ)(θΞ − Λ − Λ0)−1Λ0 = α0Λ0.
Now vectorize the inner two terms:
vec
¡




(θΞ − Λ)(θΞ − Λ − Λ0)−1Λ0¢
which can be rewritten as
((θΞ − Λ) ⊗ Λ)vec
¡
(θΞ − Λ − Λ0)−1¢
=( Λ ⊗ (θΞ − Λ))vec
¡
(θΞ − Λ − Λ0)−1¢
.
Clearly, this condition can only hold when
I =( ( θΞ − Λ) ⊗ Λ)
−1 (Λ ⊗ (θΞ − Λ))
=
¡
(θΞ − Λ)−1 ⊗ Λ−1¢









= Υ−1 ⊗ Υ
As above, it is straightforward to check that the last equality only holds when Υ = Λ−1(θΞ − Λ)=sI for
some non-zero scalar s. Hence, Λ = θ
1+sΞ, ad i a g o n a lm a t r i x .
Finally, we show that diagonality of ΣC and ΣR implies diagonality of ΣP when members of the public




P is a diagonal matrix and ΣO
P is a symmetric matrix with zeros on its leading diagonal. By de￿nition,
ΣD
P solves (A14): i.e., ΣD
P = ΣR + Nθ
2ΣD
P ΣCΣD
P when and ΣC and ΣR are diagonal. To establish that ΣP
is diagonal, we substitute ΣD
P + ΣO













By construction, there are zeros on the leading diagonal of ΣO
P. Moreover, since ΣD
P ΣC = ΣCΣD
P are diagonal,





P . Hence, (A15) implies that the leading diagonal of ΣO
PΣCΣO
P must also contain all zeros if
ΣP = ΣD
P + ΣO




k =0 ,i = 1,2,...K, (A16)
where ık as a 1 ￿ K vector with k0th. element equal to one, and all the other elements equal to zero. Now





























=0 ,i = 1,2,...K,






for all j and k. Hence, ΣO
P must be a matrix of zeros, and ΣP is diagonal.
A7